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

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## DEPUTIES ' MEETING

Wednesday, 1 April 1953

Mr. Dulles:



[REDACTED] The Director stated that this was a political problem and he felt we should stay out altogether. However, if it was decided that it was U.S. Government policy to take sides in this problem, CIA should be prepared with an appropriate plan to support such action. After some further discussion, the Director undertook to call [REDACTED]

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
Mr. Wisner:

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b. Noted that [redacted] was in Washington for a short visit. Mr. Dulles asked [redacted] to extend an invitation to him for lunch on 6 April.



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d. Reported that Ambassador Bohlen would be unable to keep his appointment with the Director tomorrow and suggested that Mr. Dulles join him and Ambassador Bohlen for breakfast on the 2nd.



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Mr. Amory:

Referred to a progress report prepared by the State Department on NSC 136/1 and in particular to the detailed information contained therein on certain operations of this Agency and after some discussion undertook to obtain the views of Mr. Lay as to whether the above report should be (1) withdrawn, (2) its circulation limited, or (3) noted at the next NSC meeting and then withdrawn.

Mr. Becker:

a. Reported that a survey of conditions in [redacted] had convinced us we should [redacted] at this time; however, the door had been left open in the event it was determined to do this at a later date. This decision in the main was based on the fact that [redacted]


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[redacted] Mr. Becker went on to say that in order to placate the [redacted] we had agreed to give them a sanitized version of ~~the~~ *Survey mentioned* ~~material that would be of interest to them.~~

*above.*



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Mr. Becker (continued)

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b. Reported that fragmentary intelligence received and some speculation led him to believe that the communists might possibly propose a peaceful unification of Indo China. The Director stated if and when it was possible to base this on some fact, a memorandum should be prepared for  in order that he might bring it to the attention of the President.

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